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Interest Analysis and an Enhanced Degree

of Specificity: The Wrongful Death Action
David E. Seidelson*
Interest analysis has come to be recognized as a phrase of legal art'
and an acceptable method of resolving choice-of-law problems. In a
relatively short period of time, the method has been embraced by courts
impressive both in number 2 and in individual judicial prestige. The
essence of interest analysis lies in the fashioning of an indicative law 4
which will result in the resolution of a choice-of-law problem by the
* B.A. University of Pittsburgh, L.L.B. University of Pittsburgh. Professor of Law,
George Washington University.
1. See, e.g., REESE & ROSENBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES AND MATERIALS 571 (1971);
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 226 (1971); CRAMPTON & CURRIE,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 208 (1968); SCOLES & WEINTRAUB, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONFLiCr OF LAWS 442 (1967).
2. WEINTEAUB, supra note 1, at 234: "In a short time, the District of Columbia and

at least 21 states have rejected the place-of-wrong rule in some context, usually in a
court decision revealing general acceptance of the premises of state-interest analysis."
Professor Weintraub, at the same citation, indicates judicial approval of the technique
has come also from the Supreme Court of the United States, the Third Circuit and the
House of Lords.
The trend toward interest analysis was illustrated in a recent diversity case.
Both litigants agreed that the trial court correctly determined "that North Dakota would
now abandon its older rule of 'lex loci delecti' [sic] and follow the more modern conflict
of law principle of 'significant contacts.'" Trapp v. 4-10 Investment Corp., 424 F.2d 1261,
1263 (8th Cir. 1970).
3. A determination of the prestigiousness of courts is admittedly highly subjective.
Having made that concession, I would note that among those courts having embraced
interest analysis are the Supreme Court of California, the Court of Appeals of New York,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See, respectively, Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967);
Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); Cipolla v.
shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970); Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
4. The phrase "indicative law" is intended to refer to "those rules which indicate the
system of dispositive rules which is to be applied." Taintor, Foreign Judgments in Rem:
Full Faith and Credit v. Res Judicata in Personam, 8 U. PITT. L. REv. 223, 233 & n.58
(1942). It seems to me that "indicative law" is simpler and no less descriptive than such
phrases as "conflict-of-laws laws" or "conflict-of-laws rules."
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application of the dispositive law5 of that state having the greatest
interest in the specific issue presented. It is the antithesis of that older
methodology which resolved choice-of-law problems by the mechanical
application of rigid indicative laws, dictated by the cause of action asserted.6 Thus, many courts which once resolved virtually all choice-oflaw problems in tort cases by the application of lex loci delicti, have
now come to recognize the propriety of precisely formulating the issue
presented, determining which states have legitimate interests in that
issue, identifying each of those interests, deciding which state's interests
are paramount, and applying the dispositive law of that state to resolve
the specific issue presented.7
As interest analysis has become more generally accepted and utilized
by courts, counsel have become more facile in recognizing the possibilities of using interest analysis to further their clients' causes. This
facility is manifested by an ever increasing degree of innovation and
sophistication in identifying state interests in a particular issue and
emphasizing-or denigrating-the significance of those interests.8 Consequently, it becomes an ever more demanding and complex judicial
task to consider and weigh intelligently the asserted interests of the
states involved. One measure of assistance in accomplishing that task lies
in the court's capacity, with the assistance of counsel, of enhancing the
degree of specificity of the facts before the court and relevant to the
choice-of-law problem. It would seem that the greater the degree of
factual specificity achieved by the court, the greater would be the likelihood of the court's achieving the soundest choice-of-law resolution attainable. Yet, there is already some evidence of reluctance or even
5. The phrase "dispositive Law" is intended to refer to "those rules which are used
to determine the nature of rights arising from a fact-group, i.e., those which dispose of
a claim." Taintor, supra note 4. It seems to me that "dispositive law" is more accurate
and descriptive than such phrases as "municipal law" or "internal law." I am indebted
to the late Dean Charles W. Taintor II for his creation of the phrases "indicative law"
and "dispositive law."
6. See, e.g., Coster v. Coster 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943); Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa.
353, 185 A. 775 (1936).
7. Compare the cases cited supra note 6 with those cited supra note 3.
8. In Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967), defendant attempted
(unsuccessfully) to distinguish Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.

1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963), and to diminish New York's interest in the
choice-of-law problem presented (potential application of the Massachusetts ceiling on
recovery in wrongful death actions) by apprising the court of the beneficiaries' change
of domicile after decedent's death. In Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 55 N.J. 511, 263,A.2d
129 (1970), defendant attempted (unsuccessfully) to diminish the interest of plaintiff's
domicile state (Connecticut) in his recovery by arguing that that state's indicative law
(lex loci delicti) would lead to the imposition of the potentially applicable (Iowa) guest
statute and a judgment for the New Jersey defendant. See Seidelson, The Americanization
of Renvoi, 7 DuQ. L. REv. 201, 222 (1969).
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active resistance toward achieving such an enhanced degree of specificity
on,the part of some courts and some legal writers. The reluctance or
resistance demonstrated sometimes rests on a relatively broad policy
assertion-"a choice-of-law rule need not achieve perfect justice every
time it is invoked in order to be preferable to the no-rule approach" 9and sometimes rests upon a more particular ground, depending on the
particular fact about which greater specificity has been offered by counsel or sought by the court. It is the purpose of this article to examine the
efficacy of an enhanced degree of factual specificity in resolving a particular choice-of-law problem in a wrongful death action and the validity of
some of the reasons offered, or which may be offered, to reject such
enhanced specificity. It is intended that such an examination may suggest an appropriate technique applicable to other conflicts problems in
other types of cases. To accomplish the first stated purpose (and to hope
to fulfill the stated intention), a hypothetical set of facts is nearly essential.
It may be helpful to fashion a hypothetical fact situation not basically
dissimilar from cases already decided. 10 Assume that X, domiciled in
New York, lost his life in an airplane crash in Massachusetts. The
flight, a regularly scheduled interstate trip, began in New York and was
intended to end in Massachusetts. D, whose plane crashed, is a corn9. Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 551, 644 (1968). Professor Rosenberg's article is cited in REESE & ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 603 with this
prefatory comment:
However worthy the concern of modem conflicts scholars for case-by-case justice
instead of an illusionary quest for uniformity, simplicity and predictability, there
are clear signs that the no-rules approach has gotten out of hand. An agitated statement of that conclusion [was made] by one of the editors of this volume ...
The above prefatory comment is followed by an excerpt from Professor Rosenberg's article. In turn, that excerpt is followed by this language:
Soundly designed principles and rules will avoid some of the escalating complexities
of the no-rules approaches. They will escape the illogicality of using liability insurance as a choice-influencing consideration without taking evidence on whether it exists
and to what extent
Id. at 604.
Perhaps the most dependable method of avoiding consideration of a potential non-fact
in resolving a choice-of-law problem is to secure an enhanced degree of specificity as to
the relevant fact. A court willing to do that presumably would receive evidence as to the
existence and extent of liability insurance in the situation described by Professor Rosenberg. Thus, judicial acquiescence in or insistence on an enhanced degree of specificity
seems to be the surest way of avoiding Professor Rosenberg's identified illogical conclusion. It seems somewhat startling to find that the methodology eschewed by Professor
Rosenberg is uniquely efficacious in avoiding his exclamatory undesirable conclusion.
It should be noted, too, that an enhanced degree of specificity is not synonymous with
a "no-rules approach." Rather, it would result in the development of rules to be applied
in a highly refined and appropriately discriminating manner.
10. See Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963); Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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mercial airline, incorporated in Massachusetts and doing business in
New York, Massachusetts, and many other states. P, X's surviving widow,
institutes a wrongful death action against D in a New York court. D
asserts the Massachusetts ceiling on recoveries in wrongful death actions,1' and P contends that the ceiling is inapplicable because of New
York's paramount interest in the specific issue presented.
It seems reasonable to assume that a critical factor in determining the
extent and degree of New York's interest will be the domicile in New
York of P.12 If the Massachusetts ceiling is imposed to the economic

jeopardy of a New York domiciliary (especially a dependent widow), she
11. At the time of the operative facts which gave rise to Kilberg, Pearson, and Gore,
supra note 10, Massachusetts had a statute specifically applicable to common carrier defendants and limiting recovery in a wrongful death action to not less than $2,000 nor
more than $15,000, depending on the degree of culpability of the defendant. MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (1949). However, at that same time, Massachusetts had a statute providing for recovery of not less than $2,000 nor more than $20,000 in wrongful death actions against defendants generally. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 229, § 2C (1951). Prior to the
1951 amendment, the maximum recovery against defendants generally was $15,000. MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2C (1947). At the present time, Massachusetts has a statute applicable both to common carrier defendants and defendants generally which limits recovery
in a wrongful death action to not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000, depending
upon the degree of culpability of the defendant. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (1967).
12. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962); Id. at 144 (dissenting opinion). Determining the extent and degree of the Massachusetts interest in having its statutory ceiling imposed is complicated by the Massachusetts legislative scheme.
See note 11 supra. The statute specifically applicable to common carriers would suggest
a rather sharply focused interest in protecting the economic integrity of Massachusetts
based carriers for the purpose of assuring that state continued essential public carriage
service. However, the existence of a Massachusetts statute applicable to defendants generally and providing for similar limited liability necessarily tends to broaden (and perhaps dilute) the interest of Massachusetts into one concerned with protecting the economic
integrity of all Massachusetts wrongful death action defendants.
The problem is complicated further by judicial recognition of two potentially inconsistent purposes underlying the Massachusetts ceiling statute. It has been stated that the
statute is penal and intended to deter culpable conduct by predicating the amount of
liability on the degree of culpability. Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. United
States, 352 U.S. 128 (1956); Tiernan v. Westext Transport, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1256, 1263
(D. R.I. 1969). Simultaneously, it has been held that the ceiling statute is intended to
protect Massachusetts residents from large recoveries in death cases. Tiernan, supra lit
1264.
In the context of the choice-of-law problem considered in the text, those ambivalent
purposes probably would lead to these conclusions. To the extent that the ceiling statute
is intended to be penal and thus deterrent, the interest of Massachusetts would be served
better by the application of New York's no-ceiling law, since the sting of unlimited recovery would more effectively penalize the culpable defendant and deter it and others
similarly situated from such future conduct. That suggests a false conflict situation in
that the interests of both states would be served better by the application of New York's
law. However, to the extent that the ceiling statute is intended to protect Massachusetts
residents from large recoveries in death cases, there is a true conflict. New York's interest
in the New York plaintiff would be advanced by the application of the New York law,
and the interest of Massachusetts in the Massachusetts defendant would be advanced by
the application of the Massachusetts ceiling. It seems appropriate to conclude that the
penal interest of Massachusetts is one limited by the ceiling figure, and that, beyond that
figure, the Massachusetts interest is directed at protecting Massachusetts defendants from
large recoveries in death cases. Therefore, our hypothetical case presents a true conflict.
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may become indigent and a ward of the state. As her state of domicile, it
will be New York which would bear the primary expense of contributing
to the support of its ward. Since New York has no ceiling on recoveries
in wrongful death actions (and a state constitutional provision prohibiting such a ceiling), 13 the forum may well conclude that New York is
sufficiently concerned about the continued economic integrity of its
dependent survivors and its state to justify the non-imposition of the
Massachusetts ceiling. In short, the New York court may find New York
to have the paramount interest in the issue presented and fashion an
indicative law referring to the dispositive law of New York.
But wait. Suppose counsel for D offers to prove that, after the death of
X, P abandoned her New York domicile and established a bona fide
domicle in Maryland. Should the court hear the offered evidence and,
assuming it demonstrates the newly acquired domicile, determine the
effect of the change of domicile on the choice-of-law problem presented?
Several courts have said no; 14 one has said yes.' 5 Of those courts refusing
to consider the newly acquired domicile, each seems to have been influenced by a presumed impropriety in taking into account such an
after-the-death (of X) change of domicile because of the potential offered to P for forum shopping,'6 or, as Professor Weintraub has labelled
it, "house-shopping. ' 17 The impropriety, of course, is based on the
concern that, if P's new domicile were to be recognized judicially, she
might be tempted to make an after-the-death move with an eye toward
'the potential dollar value of the wrongful death action. And so she
might. Thus, the issue is framed: Should the court consider the enhanced degree of specificity available as to a fact critical to resolution of
the choice-of-law problem, or does the invitation to engage in "houseshopping" require judicial "ignorance" of a fact known to all?
In referring to Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,' s Professor Weintraub
13. N.Y. CONsT., art. I, § 16.
14. Doiron v. Doiron, 109 N.H. 1, 241 A.2d 372 (1968); Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rptr.
31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967); Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).
15. Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 237 N.E.2d 877, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1968).
16. See cases cited supra note 14.
17. WEINRAUB, supra note 1, at 249 (1971). Perhaps a more accurately descriptive
phrase would be "domicile shoping."
18. In comparing Gore with Reich v. Purcell, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967),
one is confronted with a dilemma. In the former case, the Second Circuit fashioned an
unrealistic interest on the part of New York (in the physical safety of the New York domiciled decedent), as a means of avoiding a feared invitation for forum shopping and the
awkwardness of pretending that the wrongful death action beneficiaries were domiciled
in New York when all (including the court) knew they were domiciled in Maryland. In
Reich, Chief Justice Traynor, as a means of avoiding a feared invitation for forum shopping, candidly treated the wrongful death action beneficiaries as Ohio domiciliaries when
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has written that judicial consideration of P's change of domicile from
New York to Maryland would have been inappropriate because (1) the
move did not enhance the potential value of the wrongful death action,
but, if anything, diminished it, and (2) "we would not want the widow's
move to more congenial surroundings in a time of intense bereavement
to have the draconian effect of reducing compensation for the dependents by many hundreds of thousands of dollars."' 19 On the other hand,
if the after-the-death change of domicile has the capacity of enhancing
the dollar value of the wrongful death action, Professor Weintraub
would have the court consider the change in resolving the choice-of-law
problem "if it is unlikely that the move . . . was made in order to in20
fluence the choice of applicable law."
I like to think that I possess some of Professor Weintraub's sensitivity
to human emotions "in a time of intense bereavement" and perhaps a
little (though not nearly so much) of his concern over motivation for
the change of domicile. But it seems to me that the appropriate question
to ask is: Has the plaintiff-beneficiary acquired a new bona fide domicile? If the answer to that question is no, the change of residence should
be ignored in resolving the choice-of-law problem since the continuing
state of domicile retains its legitimate interest in the economic integrity
of its domiciliary. However, if the answer to that question is yes, then
the interest of the former state of domicile is substantially diminished,
the interest of the new state of domicile in the continuing economic
integrity of its domiciliary becomes one of critical importance, and the
forum should consider the change in resolving the choice-of-law problem. The court may determine that a change of residence by the surviving widow from New York to Maryland with the intention of remaining
temporarily with her mother 2 1-perhaps
until the "time of intense
bereavement" had passed-was not a change of domicile. Similarly, a
change of residence motivated solely by a desire to enhance the dollar
value of the wrongful death action, and unaccompanied by the requisite
all (including the court) knew they were California domiciliaries: "Although plaintiffs
now reside in California, their residence and domicile at the time of the accident are the
relevant residence and domicile." 63 Cal. Rptr. at 34, 432 P.2d at 730. It is difficult to
determine which of the two judicial postures is the more awkward.
For a discussion of what might have occurred had Chief Justice Traynor looked to
Ohio's indicative law, see Seidelson, supra note 8, at 213.
19. WmNTRmuB, supra note 1, at 250. Professor Weintraub noted that the rationale
of Gore "seems unrealistic." The rationale was that New York's no-ceiling law was
intended to make others more careful in dealing with the lives and physical integrity of
New York domiciliaries. See Seidelson, supra note 8, 208 & n.23.
20. Id. at 251.
21. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 717, 719 (2d Cir. 1967).
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intent, might be found judicially not to be a bona fide change of domicile. Yet if the residence and intent required legally to effect a bona fide
change of domicile are found to exist, even where the surviving widow
was motivatd to move either by a desire for "more congenial surroundings" or a potentially larger wrongful death action judgment or settlement, the change of domicile should be considered by the court. And
such consideration would appear to be appropriate whether the bona
fide change of domicile had the capacity of enhancing or diminishing
the dollar value of the action. For a court to conclude seriatim that (1)
a critical factor in determining which state has the paramount interest in
the issue of whether or not a ceiling on recovery should be imposed in a
wrongful death action is the domicile of the dependent survivor, (2)
because that state of domicile has the greatest concern over the support
of its potentially indigent domiciliary, but (3) an after-the-death change
of domicile by the dependent survivor will be ignored would constitute
a perversion of interest analysis. It would impose upon a court, purporting to resolve a choice-of-law problem by rational consideration of the
legitimate interests of the states involved, a non-fact: that the widow is
domiciled in one state when in law and in fact she is domiciled in
another. That kind of indulgence in fiction is contrary to the very essence of interest analysis.
To those who may remain offended by P's capacity to affect the
litigation by effecting a bona fide change of domicile after X's death,
some consolation may be found in a long accepted legal precedent. A
potential divorce-action plaintiff, by effecting a bona fide change of
domicile, may determine the availability of jurisdiction to hear and
determine the divorce action 22 and the statutory grounds available for
divorce. 28 Those consequences of the plaintiff's acquisition of a new
22. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Jennings v. Jennings, 251 Ala. 73,
6 So. 2d 236 (1948); Voss v. Voss, 5 N.J. 402, 75 A.2d 889 (1950).
A three-judge federal court has held that a statutory residence requirement (over and
above domicile) for divorce actions is violative of the equal protection and due process
clauses, since such a requirement denies bona fide domiciliaries access to the only means
of securing a divorce, judicial proceedings. Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F. Supp. 1353
(E.D. Wis. 1971). In my own view, the capacity to make refined choice-of-law decisions
provided by interest analysis would justify treating divorce actions as transitory and
eliminating domicile as a jurisdictional requirement. See Seidelson, Interest Analysis and
Divorce Actions, 21 BUFF. L.R. 315 (1972).
23. The rule is ... well established that it is the divorce statute of the forum which
governs the granting of a divorce. This is true even though all the operative facts occurred in some other state. If those facts constitute grounds for divorce according to
the law of the forum, the divorce may be granted. If they do not, it may not be.
CLARK, THE LAw OF Dom.sTic RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 327 (1968).
If divorce were a transitory action, an indicative law fashioned through interest analysis
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domicile exist even though the change of domicile is made after the
conduct constituting the grounds for divorce has occurred and even
though the divorce-action defendant has no legal capacity to control
the plaintiff's selection of a new domicile. It is true, of course, that if the
divorce-action defendant is not served within the forum state or does
not enter an appearance in the proceedings, he may collaterally attack
the forum's determination of plaintiff's domicile.24 It is also true that,
absent personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the forum will lack
appropriate jurisdiction to enter an alimony decree entitled to full faith
and credit in other states. 25 But those jurisdictional limitations do not
make the divorce-action analogy inapposite to our hypothetical wrongful
death action. For if the divorce-action defendant is personally before the
court, the court's determinations-including those of plaintiff's domicile
and the alimony rights and liabilities of the parties-will be binding on
the defendant. 26 In our wrongful death action, the litigants are personally before the courit. Theefore, as in the truly contested divorce
action, the issue of P's domicile may be fully litigated and finally
concluded.
There is another aspect of the divorce proceeding which is analogous
to our wrongful death action. That which serves to provide jurisdiction
to hear and determine the divorce action and to make available to the
forum its own dispositive law in determining the grounds for divorce is
plaintiff's domicile in the forum state. Why? Because of the recognized
legitimate interest which each state has in the marital status of its domiciliariesY. Similarly, in our wrongful death action, it is P's recently
acquired domicle which gives Maryland a legitimate interest in the
potential applicability of the Massachusetts ceiling statute. After all,
Maryland has a legitimate interest in the economic integrity of its domiciliaries.
Finally, there is a distinction between the divorce action and our
probably would refer the forum to the statutory grounds in the state of plaintiff's domicile.
Seidelson, supra note 22, at 331.
24. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 886 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287 (1942). See Seidelson, The Full Faith and Credit Clause; An Instrument for Resolution of IntranationalConflicts Problems, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 554, 571 (1964); Corwin,
Out-Haddocking Haddock, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 341 (1945).
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v.
Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
26. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Carter v. Carter, 147 Conn. 238, 159 A.2d
173 (1960) (personsal service on the defendant); Keen v. Keen, 191 Md. 31, 60 A.2d 200
(1948) (personal appearance by the defendant). Cf., Gherardi de Parata v. Gherardi de
Parata, 179 A.2d 723 (D.C. Mun. App. 1962), noted at 31 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 515 (1962).
27. See note 22, supra.
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wrongful death action which provides an emphatic a fortiori propriety
to the court's consideration of the newly acquired domicile in the latter
action. In the divorce action, the forum is permitted the direct application of its own dispositive law in determining the grounds available for
divorce to its new domiciliaries. In our wrongful death action, the
forum's consideration of P's change of domicile is not to serve the
parochial interests of the forum in the direct application of its own
dispositive law. Quite the contrary. The forum's consideration of the
after-the-death change of domicile is for the purpose of determining
which of the "competing" states has the paramount interest in the
specific issue presented so that the forum may fashion and utilize an
indicative law referring to the dispositive law of that state.
To those still offended by P's capacity to affect the litigation by
effecting a bona fide change of domicile after X's death, there remains
at least a partial factual consolation. Not every widow confronted with
similar circumstances is likely to effect a similar change of domicile.
Many such widows might find a change of domicile during "a time of
intense bereavement" intolerable-even in the face of advice from
counsel to effect such a change where the change could enhance the
dollar value of the wrongful death action. These widows might well
decide to remain near relatives and friends rather than emigrate to a
"strange" state. The consolations offered by familial, friendly or familiar
attachments might outweigh even the enticement of enhancing the dollar
value of the wrongful death action. And to add to the partial factual
limitations on such after-the-death domicile changes, it should be remembered that only a distinct minority of the states continues to have
wrongful death action recovery ceilings.
Even having noted those factual limitations, I feel compelled by
candor to pose and answer the following question: If the forum were to
consider the after-the-death change of domicile in determining the
applicability of a ceiling on recovery, would some (perhaps a relatively
substantial number) of such widows effect a self-aggrandizing change of
domicile? Undoubtedly. But given the reasons underlying interest
analysis, it would be intellectually dishonest and inherently inconsistent
for a court to ignore a factual change in a factor critical to the resolution
of the choice-of-law problem presented.
Assuming that the forum in our hypothetical wrongful death action
does take into accourt P's new domicile, what are the likely legal consequences? Clearly, New York's interest in the issue presented is
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diminished substantially, and Maryland's interest is enhanced dramatically. Presumably, the forum would then look to Maryland's dispositive
law to determine if that state, like Massachusetts, has a recovery ceiling.
The forum will discover no such ceiling in Maryland's dispositive law;
thus there continues to be a conflict between the dispositive law of P's
domicile state and the dispositive law of Massachusetts, the state in
which X sustained the death-producing injury. Then, either because
of its own intellectual curiosity or at the insistence of counsel for D, the
court may look to Maryland's indicative law. If it does, it will discover that the highest appellate court of Maryland has expressly disavowed interest analysis in favor of the rentention of lex loci delicti in
tort cases, even those cases involving Maryland domiciliaries. 28 Consequently, if P had brought the wrongful death action in Maryland, her
present domicile, the court would have imposed the Massachusetts
ceiling on recovery. There would appear to be no legitimate reason for
the New York forum to treat P better than she would be treated in the
courts of her state of domicile as to a specific issue in which P's domicile
has a unique interest. 29 In fact, if the New York forum did not impose
the Massachusetts ceiling, it would be extending an invitation to P and
others similarly situated to engage in the most undesirable kind of
forum shopping.
If the forum does impose the Massachusetts ceiling, would it violate
any constitutional right of P? The answer must be no. After all, the
choice-of-law resolution resulted from the volitional act of P in changing her domicile. Whether or not P actually knew the legal consequences
of that volitional act, she should be held to constructive knowledge of
the consequences flowing from the legally significant act of effecting a
domicile change. Since P will have retained counsel before initiating
formally the wrongful death action, she will have had the opportunity
to be made aware of the potential legal consequences resulting from her
domicile change. She seems to be in no position to assert successfully a
due process8 ° surprise argument. Moreover, since the forum's conclusion
is predicated on the legitimate interest of Maryland, P's domicile, in
the specific issue presented, it is a choice-of-law resolution comfortably
resting on legal contacts automatically convertible into acceptable legal
interests on the part of Maryland. The forum has done no more than to
White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966), noted at 27 MD. L. REv. 85 (1967).
See note 12, supra.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

28.
29.
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utilize interest analysis in such a way as to resolve a choice-of-law problem by the application of the law (and in this instance the total law,
including the indicative law) of a state having the paramount interest
in the issue presented.
Let's reverse the consequences. If P had been domiciled in Maryland
at the time of X's death in Massachusetts, and subsequently acquired a
new domicile in New York, her after-the-death move would have the
potential of enhancing the dollar value of the wrongful death action.
Should the New York forum consider that domicile change in resolving
the choice-of-law problem presented by the Massachusetts ceiling on
recovery? I think the answer must be yes. Still assuming that the forum
finds that P's domicile state has the paramount interest in the issue presented, because of its concern over the economic integrity of its domiciliary, it would pervert the basic rationale underlying interest analysis
to ignore the legal fact of P's New York domicile. If that domicile is
recognized judicially, nonapplication of the Massachusetts ceiling seems
certain.
What considerations might deter the forum from so concluding? First,
the forum could be concerned that its decision would have the effect of
influencing others in circumstances similar to P's to migrate to New
York. That kind of migration raises two related concerns: (1) such dependent survivors could impose an undue economic burden on New
York, and (2) such migration could increase New York's population at
a time when it did not care to have a population increase. The first concern seems not to be an overwhelming one. If New York takes into account P's change of domicile, with the resultant non-application of the
Massachusetts ceiling, P's recovery will have the potential of compensating her for the pecuniary loss occasioned by X's death. Presumably,
then, P would create no unique economic burden for New York as a
single additional self-sustaining domiciliary.
The second concern is a slightly more complicated one, if for no
other reason than its capacity for raising a constitutional problem. May
the New York forum, in the process of resolving a choice-of-law problem, take into account the potential effect of that resolution on New
York's population, and so resolve the problem that the likelihood of a
81
population increase is averted? The privileges and immunities clause,
32
the equal protection clause and a recent three-judge decision in a
31.

U.S. CONST. art. 4,

§

2.

32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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federal court in Wisconsin3 3 at least imply that it may not. If it may not,
the court, once judicially recognizing P's New York domicile, could not
avoid the choice-of-law consequences of that legal fact. P would enjoy
the non-application of the Massachusetts ceiling, and New York would
be compelled to expose itself to a potential immigration of wrongful
death action plaintiffs (as new domiciliaries) previously domiciled in
other states having wrongful death action recovery ceilings or indicative
laws which would impose such ceilings.
If, on the other hand, the New York forum would be constitutionally
free to consider its state's (presumed) desire not to enlarge its population, the court would be compelled to weigh that desire (which would
be fulfilled by the application of the Massachusetts ceiling) against New
York's desire to avoid having potentially indigent domiciliaries who
might become state wards (which would be fulfilled by the non-application of the Massachusetts ceiling). The forum would be weighing
competing interests of the same state in a specific issue. Yet, New York's
constitutional and internal judicial law, repudiating such recovery
ceilings, would not be dispositive of the issue since each was fashioned
for wholly domestic purposes, and our case presents a choice-of-law
problem. Judicial resolution of the issue probably would be influenced
greatly by the court's prediction of how many wrongful death action
plaintiffs would be induced to become New York domiciliaries if such
a domicile change enlarged the dollar value of the action.
In making that prediction, the court would be assisted enormously
if counsel were permitted to demonstrate to the court (a) the number
of states having wrongful death action recovery ceilings, (b) the number
of states having indicative laws which would impose such ceilings, (c)
the number of wrongful death actions per year in each of those states,
and (d) the number of those actions in which after-the-death domicile
changes could affect the dollar value of the cause of action. Should
counsel be permitted the opportunity to adduce such evidence, thus
enhancing the degree of specificity of facts relevant to the court's decision? The answer should be yes. Otherwise, the court's prediction is
much less likely to be an accurate one and, by definition, it will be
speculation without available data. Let's assume such information is
received by the court and that it impels the court to the conclusion that
non-application of the Massachusetts ceiling would not result in an
undesirable population expansion in New York. Then the court could
33.
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refuse application of the ceiling with some degree of certainty that the
state's desire for a relatively stable population would not be frustrated.
But suppose, despite judicial receipt of the data indicated above, the
court's prediction proves to be inaccurate and experience demonstrates
that a much larger number of wrongful death action plaintiffs than
anticipated are enticed into New York as domiciliaries, contrary to
New York's population control desires. Should a New York court subsequently confronted with a similar choice-of-law issue consider that
experience in resolving the issue? Of course. The forum would then
have the advantage of an enhanced degree of specificity about a fact
relevant to the choice-of-law decision.
There is a second consideration which might deter the court from
recognizing P's domicile change, and, therefore, should be considered
here. D might assert that judicial recognition of the after-the-death
change of domicile, with its dollar value consequence, violates D's due
process 34 rights. In essence, D's argument would be that it had a right to
rely on a random distribution of domiciles on the part of the wrongful death action beneficiaries, unaffected by after-the-death domicile
changes by those beneficiaries. To recognize such domicile changes
would frustrate D's legitimate expectations, subject it to choice-of-law
decisions it could not have contemplated and thereby impose liability
to a constitutionally disproportionate extent. Perhaps the single most
critical question to be determined in resolving that constitutional assertion is the propriety of D's expectation of a random, which in this
instance means static, distribution of domiciles. Every natural person
has the legal and factual capacity to change his domicile. D, as a legal
entity, should be held to knowledge of that capacity. Therefore, factually, D could not reasonably have anticipated unchanged domiciles
on the part of the wrongful death action beneficiaries. More precisely,
what D would be asserting is something like this: It could and should
have anticipated after-the-death domicile changes by the beneficiaries,
but it could not have anticipated that any legal consequences would
have followed from such domicile changes.
The assertion is not very persuasive. From the earliest cases of interest
analysis, it has been clear that the interest of plaintiff's state of domicile
could be sufficiently great to indicate the manner in which choice-of-law
problems would be resolved.35 More specifically, it has been clear that,
34. U.S.
35.

CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959);
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in determining the applicability of a wrongful death action ceiling on
recovery, the interest of plaintiff's domicile could be sufficiently great
to dictate the manner in which that particular choice-of-law problem
would be resolved. The single most influential reason for that determination has been the domicile state's interest in the continuing economic integrity of its dependent domiciliary. When that conclusion is
coupled with the predictability of domicile changes by wrongful death
action beneficiaries, D's due process argument tends to evaporate.
It is concluded and suggested, therefore, that in resolving the choiceof-law problem of the applicability of a ceiling on recovery in a wrongful
death action the court should recognize and give appropriate effect to
an after-the-death change of domicile by the beneficiary, whether such
a change tends to diminish or enhance the dollar value of the action.
Let's consider now a different fact relevant to the choice-of-law problem and about which counsel may offer, or a court may desire, information capable of producing an enhanced degree of specificity. We can
do so and still retain most of the original hypothetical set of facts, discarding only P's change of domicile after X's death. The choice-of-law
problem remains whether or not to apply the Massachusetts ceiling on
wrongful death action recoveries. It already has been noted that the
state of domicile of P (New York) has a legitimate interest in that issue
because, if the ceiling is imposed, P may become indigent and a state
ward. That interest on the part of P's domicile state may be deemed
greater than the interests of Massachusetts in having its ceiling imposed,
even in a case where the defendant is a Massachusetts corporation.
But suppose counsel for the defendant offers to prove that P is the
life beneficiary of an irrevocable trust which assures that she will be
comfortably cared for, economically, the rest of her life. Let's assume
that the settlor was not one whose death would give rise to a wrongful
death action in which P would be a beneficiary. 36 Should the court receive and consider the evidence in resolving the choice-of-law problem?
Rather clearly, the evidence, if received and considered, has the capacity
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961);
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912
(1963). The interest of plaintiff's state of domicile was indicated more recently in Cipolla
v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970), and emphasized in Mr. Justice Roberts'
dissent in Cipolla, 439 Pa. at 573, 267 A.2d at 859. See Symposium on Cipolla v. ShaposkaAn Application of "Interest Analysis," 9 DuQ. L. Ray. 347 (1971).
36. The purpose of the assumption is to eliminate the divergent simultaneous considerations which would confront one interested in P's economic welfare and cognizant
that his death might leave a wrongful death action. That dilemma is considered later in
regard to husband's purchase of life insurance and his estate planning.
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of diminishing substantially New York's concern that, if the Massachusetts ceiling is imposed, P will become an indigent ward of her domicile
state. To the extent that such a concern is the primary basis of New
York's legitimate interest in the issue to be resolved, the evidence is
relevant.
Two principal objections to the evidence can be anticipated: (1) consideration of P's economic status would violate the equal protection
clause,3 7 and (2) consideration of P's economic status would have an
adverse policy effect.
The constitutional objection presumably'would go something like
this. To the extent that P's economic status is considered in determining
whether or not to impose the Massachusetts ceiling, the court would be
engaged in fashioning one law for the wealthy and a different one for
the not so wealthy. Stated that way, the objection has substantial surface
appeal. After all, should there not be one law for both the rich and the
poor?3 8 There are, however, several factors to be considered before that
rhetoric is conclusively embraced.
First, it should be remembered that the hypothetical case before the
court is a wrongful death action. By generally accepted judicial precedent, the dollar value of such an action will be directly and dramatically affected by the economic status of the decedent. Decedent's
income at the time of his death and his demonstrated and potential
earning capacity will be critical factors in determining the amount of
support P could have contemplated receiving from X, had he been
permitted to live out his life expectancy. If X was a lawyer earning
$70,000 a year at the time of his death, with a demonstrated upward
curve in his income which was likely to have continued for another 20
years, the dollar value of P's wrongful death action would be substantially greater than would be the case if X had been a construction la37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. There have been recent judicial indications to the contrary. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court held that a state could not deny access to its
divorce courts to those unable to pay the court fees and costs attendant to such an action.
In finding such denial a violation of due process, the Court may have been equating
litigants with disparate financial means, but the consequence of its decision is to exact such fees from those able to pay them and to forgive such fees for those unable to pay.
In Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 991
(1971), a three-judge court determined that Pennsylvania's confession of judgment provision, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (1957), was violative of the due process rights of
natural persons having incomes of under $10,000 a year who did not knowingly waive
their rights by signing leases or consumer transaction agreements containing such a provision. Rather surprisingly, defendants did not appeal; only the plaintiffs appealed,
seeking to have the provision held unconstitutional without regard to income. 401 U.S.
991 (1971). Swarb was affirmed by the Court, 40 U.S.L.W. 4227 (February 24, 1972).
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borer earning $4 an hour, with no demonstrated or likely increase in
earnings, and demonstrated and likely periods of unemployment due to
seasonal layoffs. With the dollar value of a wrongful death action so
directly dependent upon the economic status of decedent, it seems a bit
paradoxical to suggest that consideration of the beneficiary's economic
status would be unconstitutional.
Second, it should be remembered that the problem before the court is
one of choice-of-law. If the court utilizes interest analysis in resolving
that choice-of-law problem, the court must determine which of the
competing states has the greater interest in the particular issue to be
decided. It is for the purpose of diminishing the interest of P's domicile
state, and thereby relatively enhancing the interest of Massachusetts,
that counsel for D has offered the evidence of P's economic status.
Consequently, if the forum considers the evidence for the purpose offered, it will be doing so not to determine the direct applicability of
one state's dispositive law, but for the cloIce-of_-law function of intelligently weighing the competing interests of the two states. Stated another
way, the New York court will not be considering P's economic status
for the purely internal purpose of determining the applicability of New
York's no-ceiling law, but, rather, for the purpose of determining
whether New York or Massachusetts has the greater interest in the specific issue identified: Should the ceiling be imposed?
The distinction is more than a play on words. When the framers of
the New York constitution included a provision prohibiting the imposition of a ceiling on wrongful death action recoveries, they imposed a
mandate on the state legislature and the state courts in dealing with
wholly local or internal wrongful death actions. Both were precluded
from imposing such a ceiling in such wholly local actions. Yet neither
was precluded from imposing such a ceiling in wrongful death actions
in which New York's role was solely that of the forum, or in which
some state other than New York had a legitimate interest in the imposition of such a ceiling. 9 Where New York's role was simply that of the
40
forum, such a prohibition almost certainly would be unconstitutional.
Where some other state had a greater interest in the issue, such a prohibition almost certainly would be simultaneously unwise and incon39. Maynard v. Eastern Air Lines, 178 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949).
40. Absent a legitimate interest in the issue presented, the forum's refusal to apply
a sister-state's ceiling would violate the full faith and credit clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 1. See Seidelson, supra note 24, at 563; Seidelson, Full Faith and Credit: A Modest Proposal . . . or Two, 31 Gao. WASH. L. Ray. 462 (1962).
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sistent with interest analysis. 41 By way of further elaboration, one could
concede the impropriety of a New York court's consideration of the
economic status of a wrongful death action beneficiary in determining
the applicability of New York's no-ceiling law in a wholly domestic
case without conceding the impropriety of such consideration in resolving the choice-of-law problem as to which of two states has the
greater interest in the issue of whether or not a ceiling should be imposed.
The distinction does not rest solely on the fact that New York's noceiling law is of state constitutional origin. For example, the Massachusetts ceiling is a legislative product absent state constitutional
sanction. Yet in a wholly domestic wrongful death action, that statute
would be an affirmative mandate requiring a Massachusetts court to
impose the ceiling. Consideration of the economic status of the wrongful
death action beneficiary in that wholly domestic case would be a judicial
impropriety. If, however, the Massachusetts court found itself hearing
a wrongful death action in which Massachusetts had no interest other
than that of forum, imposition of the Massachusetts ceiling almost
certainly would be unconstitutional. If the Massachusetts court found
itself hearing a wrongful death action in which decedent had been, and
the beneficiary and defendant were, domiciled in some state other than
Massachusetts (with Massachusetts being the site of the death-producing
injury), imposition of the Massachusetts ceiling, through the application
of lex loci delicti, 42 despite precedent, would surely be inconsistent with
interest analysis. Moreover, in that last instance, should the Massachusetts court decide to utilize interest analysis, consideration of the economic status of the beneficiary would not be clearly inappropriate, as
it would be in a wrongful death action purely local to Massachusetts.
It seems, then, that a court enjoys greater latitude in considering evidence for the purpose of resolving a choice-of-law problem than it does
for the purpose of determining the direct applicability of the dispositive
law of its own or some other state.
Such a conclusion ought not to be surprising. Generally, the dispositive laws of a given state, whether of constitutional, legislative or
judicial origin, are fashioned for the purpose of governing wholly local
proceedings. When a court finds itself confronted with a choice-of-law
41. Tramontana v. Varig Airlines, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
943 (1966).
42. Cf., Snow v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. N.Y. 1959).
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problem, it is not bound by those dispositive laws intended for purely
local application. Moreover, if the court has adopted interest analysis
as its technique for resolving choice-of-law problems, it must determine
which state has the greatest interest in the specific issue presented. To
do that, the forum must weigh the interests of the competing states in
that specific issue. That process of weighing each state's interests necessarily requires consideration of factors inapposite to determinations
of the applicability of a state's dispositive laws to wholly domestic cases.
This is not to suggest that the totality of the judicial process involved
in interest analysis is unrelated to the purposes underlying the dispositive laws of the competing states. In fact, once the court has identified
the specific issue to be resolved and the existence of a conflict between
the dispositive laws of the states involved, the court will be required
to determine the respective reasons for the conflicting dispositive laws
as a critical step in determining which state's interest is paramount.
Thus, in our hypothetical case, once finding a conflict between the dispositive law of New York (no ceiling) and the dispositive law of Massachusetts (ceiling), the court must decide what reasons or purposes
explain the existence of each of those conflicting laws. Still assuming
that the court concludes that the principal purpose to be achieved by
New York's no-ceiling law is the prevention of indigency on the part
of the wrongful death action beneficiary (once that beneficiary is identified as a New York domiciliary), the court will have determined that
New York has a legitimate interest in the specific issue.
To determine the relative significance of New York's interest, as opposed to the interest of Massachusetts in the imposition of its recovery
ceiling, the court may well decide that the likelihood of that potential
indigency being realized is a factor to be considered. If the beneficiary's
economic status is such that the potential will never be converted to
reality, even with the imposition of the Massachusetts ceiling, New
York's interest has been diminished in relation to the interest of Massachusetts. That impact on the relative interests of the two states comes
as the product of judicial consideration of a factor (P's economic status)
which would be irrelevant in determining the applicability of either
state's dispositive law in a wholly local proceeding-but which is relevant and appropriate in determining which state has the superior interest for the purpose of resolving a choice-of-law problem. As to that
latter purpose, the court should be free to consider all those factors affecting each state's interest in the issue to be resolved.
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Should the New York court conclude that, because of P's demonstrated economic status, New York's interest in the issue is substantially
diminished, with a relative enhancement of Massachusetts' interest, and
therefore the Massachusetts ceiling should be imposed, it would be
fashioning one indicative law for the wealthy (and presumably a different indicative law for the not so wealthy) only because the beneficiary's economic status is so directly and intimately related to New York's
interest in the choice-of-law problem to be resolved. It would not be
determining that New York's dispositive law is inapplicable to wealthy
wrongful death action beneficiaries in wholly local proceedings or that
the Massachusetts dispositive law is applicable only to wealthy wrongful death action beneficiaries in wholly local (Massachusetts) proceedings. In fashioning an indicative law which takes into account the economic status of the plaintiff, the court would merely be recognizing a
factor critical to New York's interest in the choice-of-law problem. If
the economic status of a litigant must be ignored in resolving a choiceof-law problem through interest analysis in a case where the interests
of one or both of the competing states rest almost entirely on economic
considerations, interest analysis is likely to become as stultified as its
tort predecessor, lex loci delicti.
Perhaps the most absolute way of determining the constitutional propriety of judicial consideration of P's economic status in resolving the
choice-of-law problem is to fashion a statute so providing. 43 Assume
that the New York state assembly enacted a choice-of-law statute providing that (1) no ceiling on wrongful death action recoveries should
be imposed, (2) except in cases where a state having such a ceiling has
a legitimate interest in that issue, (3) provided, however, that even then
the ceiling should not be imposed on a New York domiciled beneficiary,
(4) where such imposition posed a threat that such beneficiary would
become an indigent ward of the state. Would such a statute violate the
equal protection clause? I think not. The statute would have described
a discernible class of persons who were to be treated in a special way,
with that special treatment bearing a rational relationship to the characteristics of the class and based on an appropriate state concern. And,
after all, a court's consideration of P's economic status in resolving the
same choice-of-law problem, absent such a statute, would be based on
exactly the same factors.
It was noted earlier that decedent's economic status would directly
43.

See generally, LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 98 (1968).
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affect the dollar value of P's wrongful death action. There are other
instances in which economic status bears directly on legal consequences:
liability and the extent of liability for federal and often state and local
taxation, eligibility for welfare assistance, the amount of social security
benefits which may be retained by an employed recipient. Recently, a
New York appellate court asserted jurisdiction over a Seider-type case
even though the plaintiff was a non-resident of New York-in large
measure because of the economic status of the plaintiff.44 In each of the
above instances, the economic status of the individual immediately
involved in the legal process was deemed critical to the result. In each
instance except the last the individual's economic status was critical to
the direct application of a sovereign's dispositive law. In the last example,
the plaintiff's economic status was vital to the sovereign's determination
to assert jurisdiction. Those precedents suggest further and a fortiori the
constitutional propriety of judicial consideration of P's economic status
in deciding which of two competing states has the greater interest in the
question of whether or not a ceiling should be imposed in her wrongful
death action.
It is suggested that where the interests of one of the competing states
in a choice-of-law problem are based on that state's concern over the
economic integrity of one of the litigants, it does no violence to the
equal protection or due process clause if the forum hears and considers
evidence of the economic status of that litigant in resolving the choiceof-law problem. In fact, if such consideration is deemed to be violative
of the equal protection clause, in every case where a state's interests are
predicated on its concern over the economic integrity of a litigant, the
forum will be compelled to resolve the choice-of-law problem in judicial
ignorance of the factual degree and extent of that state's interest. In such
a situation, the forum could easily be placed in the awkward posture of
determining that New York's interests were superior to those of Massachusetts because of the domicile's legitimate interests in avoiding the
indigency of one of its domiciliaries in a case in which everyone
in the world knew to a certainty that such indigency could not result.
Let's change one aspect of our hypothetical case. Instead of having P
the life beneficiary of an irrevocable trust, let's leave her without any
independent source of means or income after X's death. Suppose that,
44. McHugh v. Paley, 63 Misc. 2d 1072, 314 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1970); Cf., Vaage v. Lewis, 29
App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1968). See Seidelson, Seider v. Roth, et seq: The Urge
Toward Reason and the IrrationalRatio Decidendi, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 42 (1970).
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before learning of that fact, the court finds that the competing interests
of New York and Massachusetts are rather neatly balanced. If counsel
for P offers evidence of her economic status, should the court receive it?
The answer must be yes. After all, the offered evidence demonstrates
that New York's interest in preventing the indigency of a New York
domiciliary is more than a general and theoretical concern; if the Massachusetts ceiling is imposed, P will almost certainly become indigent
(and a ward of the state of New York) within a predictable time period.
That enhanced degree of specificity about P's economic status, which
converts theory into reality, necessarily enhances New York's interest
in the specific issue to be resolved. How can judicial consideration of
such evidence be deemed unconstitutional? Just as consideration of P's
economic status, to the ultimate litigation jeopardy of P, in resolving the
choice-of-law problem should not be considered violative of P's equal
protection rights, so should such consideration, to the ultimate litigation
jeopardy of D, not be deemed violative of D's due process rights. In both
cases, the evidence of P's economic status is a legitimate and appropriate
factor to be considered judicially in determining which state's interests
are superior.
Assuming the constitutionality of such consideration, there remains
the question of the wisdom of considering P's economic status as a matter
of policy. If the court does consider P's economic status in resolving the
choice-of-law problem, is there created the potential for any adverse
consequences? Theoretically, yes. If the fact that P is the life beneficiary
of an irrevocable trust may jeopardize her in the judicial resolution of the
conflicts problem, such trusts may be eschewed. The settlor, during his
lifetime, could be advised by counsel that if he created such a trust it
could adversely affect the dollar value of a wrongful death action arising
out of X's death and brought by P. That advice would bear some
potential for dissuading the settlor from establishing such a trust.
Presumably, the absence of that form of assurance of P's economic
integrity would be an adverse consequence from the point of view of
New York, P's domicile. Conversely, if P is without any independent
source or means of income, consideration of her economic status in
resolving the choice-of-law problem would enhance the dollar value of
the action. Theoretically, that could persuade P and others interested in
her economic integrity to strive toward that economic condition on the
part of P. That certainly would be an adverse consequence from the
point of view of New York. The critical question becomes: Is either of
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those theoretical potentials likely to be realized? The apparent answer is
no. It is difficult to imagine that one sufficiently concerned about P's
continued economic integrity to consider establishing an irrevocable
trust with P as a life beneficiary, would be dissuaded from doing so by
the possibility that P may become the beneficiary of a wrongful death
action in which two states have legitimate interests in the issue of
damages and one of the two states has a recovery ceiling. Similarly, it is
nearly inconceivable that P or anyone interested in her continued economic integrity would be persuaded to strive toward making her a
potential indigent by the same set of contingencies. The court should
not be deterred from considering P's economic status in the process of
resolving the choice-of-law issue by potential adverse consequences
which predictably would never be converted into realities. Should the
prediction prove to be erroneous, as demonstrated by experience, the
court could then re-examine the validity of the policy reasons stated.
The same hypothetical case gives rise to a related problem involving
the propriety of examining P's economic status. Let's eliminate the
irrevocable trust in favor of P. Instead, let's asume that counsel for D
offers to prove to the court that P has received $500,000 in life insurance
benefits as a result of X's death. Should the court accept and consider
the offered evidence in resolving the choice-of-law problem as to whether
or not a ceiling on recovery should be imposed? The evidence is relevant
in that it tends to demonstrate the unlikelihood of P becoming an indigent ward of her domicile state if the ceiling is imposed. Constitutional considerations similar to those examined in regard to the
irrevocable trust suggest that judicial examination of the evidence would
do no violence to P's equal protection rights. That leaves the policy
considerations.
If the court does receive and consider the offered evidence of life
insurance benefits, may adverse social and economic consequences be
anticipated? There is the potential that New York husbands will purchase less life insurance for the benefit of their New York wives if a
consequence of substantial insurance benefits is an enhanced likelihood
that a ceiling on recovery in wrongful death actions may be imposed. Is
the potential sufficiently likely to be converted into reality to dissuade
the court from receiving and considering the offered evidence? First,
the statistical likelihood of such a case arising in terms of a coincidence
of factors such as a husband's death arising from an injury sustained by
him in a state having such a ceiling is about the same as it would be in
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the situation involving the trust. However, statistically, the likelihood of
a husband purchasing life insurance for the benefit of wife is probably
much greater than the likelihood of someone creating an irrevocable
trust for P's benefit. The majority of husbands can afford the former
economic protection for their wives; only a few individuals can afford
the latter method of providing economic protection for another since it
would require an extraordinarily large sum of money (or its equivalent)
to comprise a corpus sufficiently great to assure a comfortable life income to the beneficiary. Numerically then more husbands will be considering the purchase of life insurance for the protection of their wives
than will individuals be considering the creation of an irrevocable trust
for the protection of another. Therefore more husbands may consider
the potential adverse consequence in a conflicts case arising from
substantial life insurance benefits than other individuals may consider the same consequence arising from a substantial life income from
an irrevocable trust. Just in terms of numbers, the conflicts potential
may have the capacity of affecting more husbands and their wives if the
court considers evidence of P's life insurance benefits. Yet, there is a
countervailing factor that may affect the numbers game. Of the total
number of husbands contemplating the purchase of life insurance, only
a handful are likely to consult a lawyer. Of the total number of individuals contemplating a trust, virtually all will consult a lawyer. Thus,
while the first total may be much larger than the second, the portion
of the first total who will become aware of the possible choice-of-law
consequence probably will be not much larger numerically than the
portion of the second total who will become so aware, at least as the
result of direct legal counselling. But even absent direct legal counselling, husbands contemplating the purchase of life insurance may become aware of the choice-of-law consequence as a result of the kind
of general awareness of judicial opinions which ultimately circulates
among the community. One could predict, therefore, that such a general
awareness of judicial action would result in a greater absolute number
of husbands contemplating the purchase of life insurance becoming
aware of the conflicts potential than the absolute number of individuals contemplating irrevocable trusts. But absolute numbers of those becoming aware of the choice-of-law consequence should not be deemed
exclusively critical to the propriety of judicial consideration of the offered evidence. More critical by far would be the court's determination
of how likely those in each class (husbands contemplating life insurance
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to protect their wives and those individuals contemplating an irrevocable trust to protect another) would be to abstain from the contemplated action by realization of the potential consequence in a wrongful
death action raising the choice-of-law problem under consideration.
The purchase of life insurance by a husband for the economic protection of his wife is an act done with conscious awareness of the
certainty of death and an abiding desire to afford economic protection
for wife should husband predecease her. Such a purchase is an act done
for the explicit purpose of providing wife with some degree of economic
stability upon husband's death. To borrow a phrase of legal art from
another context, it is an act done in contemplation of death.
The amount of life insurance purchased by husband with wife as the
primary beneficiary may be affected by a number of factors: husband's
purchasing capacity in terms of money available for such a purpose,
husband's purchasing capacity in terms of an insurer's willingness to
undertake the risk, and the contemplated economic needs of wife.
Perhaps the last factor would be the most critical in determining the
amount of life insurance purchased. And it is a factor which can be
affected by a number of circumstances: wife's capacity to earn money
upon husband's death, the number of minor children who will be
dependent on wife should husband predecease her, and other sources of
money available to wife upon husband's death. In turn, other sources of
money available to wife upon husband's death can be affected by social
security benefits, annuities purchased by husband and having dollar
value at his death, and the manner in which husband dies. Should
husband's death be the result of an accident, two economic consequences
may ensue: first, the possibility of double recovery under the life insurance contract, and, second, the possibility of a wrongful death action
against the entity responsible for husband's death. While it is only a
possibility, it seems not unduly inconsistent with reality to suggest
husband's active consideration of both the likelihood of a wrongful
death action, and, assuming such an action, its potential dollar value, in
deciding the amount of life insurance to purchase for wife's benefit. If
community knowledge of judicial decisions suggests that the greater the
amount of life insurance the greater the likelihood of a ceiling on recovery being imposed, husband may be persuaded to purchase less
insurance than he otherwise might. If husband travels into states having
wrongful death action recovery ceilings, that dissuasive effect may be
intensified. Consequently, there seems to be a predictable risk that
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consideration of wife's economic status, as it is affected by life insurance
benefits received by her upon husband's death, may have the socially and
economically undesirable effect of inclining husbands toward purchasing less life insurance for their wives. To the extent that such a conclusion is achieved by the court, the court probably would conclude that
it is unwise policy to consider such life insurance benefits in determining
the applicability of a wrongful death action ceiling on recoveries. Such a
conclusion suggests an additional related problem.
Suppose that counsel for D offers to prove that the amount of money
which wife will receive from husband's estate-separate and apart from
life insurance benefits-assures that P will never become an indigent
ward of the state of her domicile, as a means of persuading the court
to impose the Massachusetts ceiling. Should the court receive and consider the offered evidence? Again, the evidence is relevant, and consideration of it seems unlikely to be unconstitutional. But how about the
policy implications? As was the case with husband's purchase of life insurance, his determination of how much of his total estate to leave to
wife at his demise will have been made in contemplation of his death.
Whether as the result of direct legal counselling or general community
awareness, at the time of making that determination husband may well
have been aware of its potential for affecting the choice-of-law problem
here considered. If so, (and assuming the greater the portion of husband's estate left to wife the greater the likelihood that the ceiling on
recovery would be imposed), husband may have been dissuaded from
leaving wife as great a portion of his estate as he otherwise might have.
Presumably, the court would consider it to be an undesirable policy to
fashion a rule of law which would deter husbands from leaving their
wives as large a portion of the husbands' estates as the husbands would
wish to. It is suggested, therefore, that the court should not consider
the value of X's estate left to P in determining the applicability of the
Massachusetts ceiling.
To what extent should that determination be affected by the legal
fact that, whatever X's wishes in the matter may have been, P will receive an irreducible portion of X's estate?45 If X died testate, devising or
bequeathing to P the statutory minimum share of his estate, or any portion greater than that minimum but less than the totality of the estate, he
may have been influenced by a fear that leaving wife a greater portion
would jeopardize her right to an unlimited recovery in a wrongful death
45.

N.Y. ESTATE, PowERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.1 (McKinney 1967).
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action arising from X's death. If X died intestate in circumstances in
which P would receive less than the totality of X's estate, X may have
been dissuaded by a similar fear from executing a will leaving P the
entire estate. But what if X died testate leaving P the entire estate?
Would the court then be safe in assuming that X had not been affected
by such a concern? Probably not. After all, X could have disposed of a
portion of his property by inter vivos actions, thus diminishing the
*dollar value of the total estate left to P. Should the court hear and
,consider evidence as to whether or not X did so, and, if so, because of
his concern over the potentially adverse litigation consequence? I think
not. Once the court has determined there is a significant potential that
husband may be dissuaded from providing by will or intestacy as fully as
he would have wished for wife, the court has determined the existence of
a legitimate policy consideration which justifies rejecting evidence of
the extent of those provisions. The possibly undesirable consequences
were there, X may have been aware of them and, therefore, affected by
them. Moreover, and of critical significance, that effect would have been
a potentially influential factor at a time when X was engaged in making
an irrevocable decision. Those considerations suggest the impropriety of
judicial consideration of the dollar value of P's share of X's estate in
determining the applicability of the Massachusetts ceiling.
Earlier it was suggested that it would be appropriate for the forum
to consider P's economic status as it would be affected by the existence
of an irrevocable trust of which P was a life beneficiary. Is that conclusion inconsistent with the suggestion at the end of the preceding paragraph? I don't think so. In each instance, the critical determination was
the degree of likelihood of judicial consideration dissuading the actor
from performing a persumably desirable act. The settlor, someone other
than P's husband, and one whose death would not give rise to a wrongful
death action for the benefit of P, would be less likely than X to be so
dissuaded. In addition to the reasons for that conclusion set forth earlier,
another should be noted. X, as P's spouse, would be uniquely susceptible
to consideration of the wrongful death action consequences of his decisions regarding P's economic status after his death. It would be that
eventuality-his death before that of P-which would give rise to both
the wrongful death action and P's receipt of her share of X's estate. That
concurrence of consequences, and X's realization of them, would make
X far more sensitive to the possibility of the estate consequences adversely affecting the dollar value of the wrongful death action.
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Still earlier in the article it was suggested that P's change of domicile
after X's death should be considered in determining the applicability
of the Massachusetts ceiling. Is that conclusion inconsistent with the
suggestion that the court should not consider X's estate planning in
regard to P? I think not. Once more, the critical determination is the
degree of likelihood that such judicial consideration would dissuade the
actor from engaging in a desirable act. P would appear to be less likely to
be dissuaded from effecting a domicile change "in a time of intense
bereavement" than X would be dissuaded from providing fully for
his potential widow, by the subsequent litigation consequences. To
complement the reasons already offered in support of that conclusion,
the marked difference in the degree of finality of those two acts should
be emphasized. While X, throughout his lifetime, may have the continuing capacity to reject or amend any previously fashioned arrangements
for P's economic security after his death, each time he exercises that
capacity the same concern over litigation consequences will be present
and equally pressing. And, like each of us, X will never know to a
certainty that there will be one more chance to reconsider, even with the
continuing concern; death, while certain, is incapable of chronological
prediction. P, however, in attempting to assuage her acute emotional
reaction to X's death, possesses two methods of avoiding irrevocable
legal consequences flowing from a change of domicile. First, she may
effect a temporary, and relatively long lasting, residence change to any
place more conducive to emotional convalescence, without effecting a
change of domicile. Second, should she make a move which does constitute a change of domicile, for general convalescence purposes, she
would continue to possess the capacity to effect another domicile change
prior to formal initiation of the wrongful death action or at least prior
to judicial determination of the choice-of-law problem. Thus, judicial
consideration of P's domicile change seems not to possess that level of
likelihood of an adverse social consequence sufficient to justify judicial
ignorance of that relevant fact. Professor Weintraub's concern over P's
psychic well-being is indeed convertible into a legitimate judicial concern; it would seem, however, that the forum would be wholly justified
in determining that judicial consideration of P's after-the-death change
of domicile does not possess a significant likelihood of deterring P from
ameliorating her "intense bereavement" by a change of locale.
By way of general summary, these conclusions and suggestions are
offered. A court confronted with a choice-of-law problem should be
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willing generally to hear and consider evidence having the capacity to
lend an enhanced degree of specificity to any of the facts relevant to the
conflicts issue. In determining specifically when to hear and consider
such evidence, the court should determine (1) if consideration of the
evidence is constitutionally permissible, and (2) if consideration of the
evidence is unlikely to result in undesirable consequences in terms of
future conduct. If the court decides both of those questions affirmatively, it should hear and consider the offered evidence. In that manner,
courts confronted with choice-of-law problems and utilizing an interest
analysis methodology to resolve those problems will be best equipped to
determine accurately the true weight and significance of the interests asserted. In doing so, courts will be taking a logical step forward in regard
to the appropriate function of counsel in assisting courts to resolve such
problems. Under the older application of lex loci delicti to resolve all
issues in a tort case, counsel had little or no effective role to play in
resolving the conflicts problem. Once the court characterized the action
as "tort," it automatically punched the lex loci delicti button and the
choice-of-law problem was resolved. With the coming of interest analysis, counsel achieved the opportunity of attempting to demonstrate to
the court which of the competing interests were of greater significance.
That, in turn, has compelled the courts to become ever more selective
and discriminating in weighing those competing interests, and that
heightened judicial effort necessarily must produce ever better results.
Counsel's role should be further enlarged to permit the introduction of
evidence which will provide the court with an enhanced degree of
specificity as to those facts relevant to resolution of the conflicts problem.
In granting counsel that role, courts will be providing a greater degree
of assurance that the underlying rationale of interest analysis-resolution of choice-of-law problems in a sensible and rational manner-will
be satisfied.
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